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ABSTRACT 
This paper descriies a strong perimeter control system for a 
general purpose processing system, with the perimeter control 
system taking significant steps to address usability issues, thus 
mitigating the tension between strong perimeter protection and 
usability. A secure front end enforces two-factor authentication 
for all interactive access to an enclave that contains a large 
supercomputer and various associated systems, with each 
requiring their own authentication. Usability is addressed through 
a design in which the user has to perform two-factor 
authentication at the secure front end in order to gain access to the 
enclave, while an agent transparently performs public key 
authentication as needed to authenticate to specific systems within 
the enclave. The paper then describes a proxy system that allows 
users to transfer files into the enclave under script control, when 
the user is not present to perform two-factor authentication. This 
uses a pre-authorization approach based on public key technology, 
which is still strongly tied to both two-factor authentication and 
strict control over where files can be transferred on the target 
system. Finally the paper describes an approach to support 
network applications and systems such as grids or parallel file 
transfer protocols that require the use of many ports through the 
perimeter. The paper describes a least privilege approach that 
dynamically opens ports on a host-specific, if-authorized, as- 
needed, just-in-time basis. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection - Access 
contuols, authentication. 
General Terms 
Design and Security. 
Keywords 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Two-factor authentication, security-based dynamic port control. 
This paper describes a multifaceted system that provides 
strong perimeter control for a large, general purpose NASA 
processing systems, while taking significant steps to address 
usability issues, thus mitigating the tension between strong 
perimeter protection and usability. 
The system described in this paper was the result of a design 
and implementation effort to provide an improved perimeter 
protection system for a newly acquired NASA supercomputer - 
the Columbia system [3]. As will be shown in the paper, 
significant steps were taken to ensure that usability did not suffer 
as the strength of the perimeter protection system was raised over 
that used with previous NASA supercomputers. 
The next section of this paper will describe the overall 
processing environment that is protected by the perimeter control 
system. Then section 3 provides a brief description of the threats 
that the system is designed to counter. Section 4 provides a 
description of the security policy that is enforced. Section 5 
describes the overall security drchitecture and the following three 
sections describe the three different sets of components that 
comprise the perimeter protection system. The fmal sections 
describe related work, conclusions and acknowledgements. 
2. PROCESSING ENVIRONMZNT 
The Columbia system is a 10,240 processor system that 
consists of a set of 20 backend nodes, with each node consisting 
of 512 processors. A 64 processor Columbia front-end system 
provides interactive support for job preparation and job 
submission to the backend nodes. 
The system supports unclassified, scientific and engineering 
processing for all of NASA's mission directorates: Aeronautics 
Research, Science, Space Operations and Exploration Systems. 
Each of the NASA mission directorates has a percentage of the 
Columbia system and they are each responsible for determining 
how users will be selected to use the assigned percentage. Some 
directorates use a general call for proposals while others will have 
particular problems that need to be addressed and will assign an 
allocation to those who are working on the problem. 
While some users are located at the Columbia facility, most 
users are geographically distributed, coming from other NASA 
centers as well as various companies and universities. For the 
most part, these users develop their own programs and execute 
them on Columbia in order to support their scientific research or 
engineering analysis. Programs are not pre-vetted prior to being 
allowed to run on the Columbia system, hence the Columbia 
system must be considered a wide open system that may need to 
support any possible type of program that may be needed to 
support scientific or engineering processing. 
In addition to having to support all manner of programs, the 
Columbia system also must be accessible from the Internet, since 
users are geographically Gistributed. In addition, to support the 
large data transfer requirements of many users, Columbia will also 
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be connected to the National LambdaRail [lo], a 10 Gigabitkec 
national, high-speed optical network. 
While some interactive processing is allowed, for the most 
part, access to Columbia is through a batch scheduling system, 
which is the Portable Batch System (PBS). One of the 
implications of running batch jobs is that the user is not 
necessarily present at the time that the job is run or at the time that 
the job needs to transfer some data. In contrast, most access to the 
Columbia front-end is interactive in order to perform job 
prepamtiQn, compilation and job submission. 
While the Columbia system is the main computation system, 
it works closely with a number of other systems, such as a mass 
storage system, a high-end visualization system as well as other 
much smaller general purpose processing systems that are co- 
located within the same facility. 
A processing factor that had a significant impact upon the 
design of a perimeter control system was the desire to allow 
Columbia to support network protocols or systems that are 
characterized by needing to open a large number of TCPKJDP 
ports. For the s o h a r e  in question, the protocol determines the 
specific ports that need to be opened at run time, from a large port 
address space. Currently Columbia supports the parallel file 
transfer protocol bbFTP, which opens a number of ports in 
parallel to achieve faster transfer rates. 
Another network system that has also been considered for 
hture support, is grid computing such as that provided by the 
Globus system [5] and which is being standardized by the Global 
Grid Forum [6]. This system uses a large number of ports selected 
from a large port address space. One researcher who has looked at 
this issue &om the perspective of access through a firewall reports 
that “The frewall port-opening approach favored by the Globus 
Project has been shown to work, after some minor adjustments, 
with a default Globus deployment. However, an outstanding issue 
of illegal port usage (not adhering to port range restrictions), for 
commands that create a return connection request, still remains. 
While testing was successful at the 3000 to 6000 port range, it is 
clear that such a small fixed range is too restricted to be of much 
value in a production grid environment.” [2]  What this means is 
that allowing 3000 ports to be accessed in the range &om port 
3000 to port 6000 is viewed as too restrictive for a production 
system, meaning that production systems may need to allow even 
a larger range of ports to be utilized. 
The need to open a significant number of ports for the 
Condor grid system is also recognized, although in this case the 
port range is restricted to approximately 255 ports [9]. The point 
is that grid-type software requires the opening of a significant 
number of ports, which opens up vulnerabilities for attacks on the 
services that may be using these ports. 
While currently not grid enabled, the security design 
anticipated possible hture grid access to Columbia and thus had 
to ensure that nothing was done that would preclude the Columbia 
system’s support for grid processing such as that provided by the 
Globus suite of tools [5] ,  or other network applications that may 
need many open ports. 
In summary, the Columbia system must be able to support 
the following: 
e 
Must be accessible from the Internet 
Must be accessible at up to a 10 Gigabitskec rate 
Must support the execution of user developed code with 
no pre-vetting 
Must support file transfers initiated by batch jobs at a 
time when the user may not be currently logged onto the 
system 
Must support network systems that dynamically open a 
large number of ports 
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The goal in developing a security system for Columbia was 
not to hinder the ability of users to do a wide range of different 
types of processing, while ensuring that the.system will not be left 
open to the threats that will be considered in the next section. 
3. THREATS 
The perimeter control system technology described in this 
paper is directed at countering external threats from non-users. In 
this case, external threats emanating fiom people and computers 
who are located anywhere on the Internet as well as people and 
computers that are located within the NASA division that houses 
the Columbia system. The perimeter control system mediates 
access by all users of the Columbia system, irrespective of their 
location. 
The types of threats that are addressed by the perimeter 
protection system are all of those that can be directed by an 
external entity against the system. This includes the man-in-the- 
middle attack in which a malicious entity is assumed to be 
monitoring and perhaps modifying the data that passes into and 
out of the system under attack. The man-in-the-middle attack can, 
for example, be used to capture passwords. Threats of concern 
also include externally mounted attempts to directly attack 
exposed services in order to gain unauthorized access to the 
system ofmount a denial-of-service attack. As has been noted, 
since the Columbia system is accessible from the Internet, it is 
open to attack from virtually any Internet connected computer. 
Since all Columbia users are highly vetted, there is less 
concem with attacks mounted by legitimate users. Techniques 
used to address these potential threats are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
4. SECURITY POLICY 
and includes the following two properties: 
The security policy for the Columbia system is rather simple 
1. Outside Initiated Policy: Access initiated from outside of 
the Columbia system must be controlled to ensure that 
only legitimate users can access Columbia and its 
associated systems. 
2.  Inside Initiated Policy: Access initiated from Columbia 
and its associated systems is unrestricted .unless there is 
some security reason to deny connections to certain site, 
but it is anticipated that there will be very limited 
exceptions to this policy. 
The inside initiuted poZicy is required since the Columbia 
users have a wide range of different types of processing that needs 
to be supported and this support may require them to connect to a 
wide variety of different systems at different locations. The users’ 
needs in this area are much too fluid to enforce any security 
constraints for access initiated h m  Columbia and its associated 
systems. 
5. SYSTEM SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
One of the guiding principles in designing the security 
architecture for Columbia was that it should satisfy the 
requirements of a security reference monitor [l]. A security 
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reference monitor is an abstract concept for a security mechanism 
that mediates access between active subjects, such as processes, 
though the user was not present (at the time of the transfer) to 
perform this authentication. The final reference monitor of the 
Figure 1: Enclave Security Architecture 
and passive objects, such as files or remote machines. The 
requirements of a security reference monitor are that it: 
Be tamper proof, so that it can not be modified by 
malicious code 
Be always invoked, so that it can support complete 
mediation 
Correctly enforce the desired security policy 
* 
For the Columbia system, the security reference monitor 
mediation is distributed over several components that collectively 
enforce d e  desired security policy. The systems that comprise the 
overall Columbia reference monitor include the following: 
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Interactive access is any type of access where the user is 
present to perform authentication, which for the Columbia system 
is two-factor authentication involving a physical authentication 
fob. Since much of the Columbia workload involves batch jobs 
that may run at times when the user is not present to perform 
authentication, the unattended file transfer reference monitor was 
identified as a needed component to couple authentication 
associated with fde transfers to two-factor authentication, even 
Reference monitor for interactive access 
Reference monitor for unattended file transfers 
Reference monitor for network access 
triad is concerned with mediating network access in order to 
reduce the number ofports that have to be opened statically. 
Figure 1 illustrates the overall security architecture of the 
system. The Columbia system and all of its associated 
processors are placed inside of a high-end computing (HEC) 
protected enclave. All users, including those who are co-located 
with the Columbia system as well as remote users, are considered 
to be outside of the enclave, and therefore are subjected to 
identical access controls. The various reference monitors that 
comprise the perimeter control system have the task of mediating 
access between external subjects, represented by users at various 
local and remote computers, and the Columbia system and its 
associated processors that are located within the KEC enclave. 
The components that implement the three reference monitors for 
the enclave are as follows: 
Secure Front End for interactive access, which performs 
two-factor authentication. 
Secure Unattended Proxy, which supports file transfers 
when the user is not present to perform two-factor 
authentication 
Perimeter EnforcedController, which dynamically 
opens and closes ports 
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Also shown in the figure is the security monitoring system, 
which is shown for completeness, but will not be discussed since 
it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The next three sections will describe each of the component 
sets that comprise the enclave’s reference monitors. 
6. INTERACTIVE ACCESS CONTROL 
requirements: 
The Secure Front End (SFE) enforces two security 
0 All interactive access to the SFE and systems within the 
enclave must use an encrypted communications 
channei with the SSH protocol providing the 
encryption. 
All interactive access to systems within the enclave 
must undergo two-factor authentication, with RSA’s 
SecurID [I 1) being the authentication mechanism used. 
The encryption provided by SSH ensures that authentication 
information as well as other information sent from the user’s 
system to the SFE is protected as it flows between systems. Of 
course, if users are accessing the enclave through a number of 
SSH hops through different systems, the information being 
communicated will be in the clear in these intermediate systems 
and thus subject to compromise through a man-in-the-middle 
attack. To prevent this, users should log directly into the SFE 
fkom their home system. To ensure the protection of infonnation 
flowing between the SFE and systems within the enclave, SSH is 
also used from the SFE to the enclave systems. SSH provides 
both remote terminal-type access as well as file transfer access 
using the scp protocol. 
The use of SecurID provides a means to counter 
es that exist since Columbia users come from systems 
with varying levels of security. It addresses cases in which a 
user’s Columbia password is captured on the remote system and 
also the case where a user might use the same password on 
Columbia as on a compromised remote system. SecurID 
authentication uses a physical device or fob that displays a 
pseudo-random number that changes every 30 seconds. As part of 
the authentication processes, the user must enter the current value 
displayed on the fob. 
As a physical device, the fob represents something that the 
user has, which is the first factor in the two-factor authentication. 
SecurD authentication also requires that the user memorize a 
personal identification number (PIN), which provides the second 
factor in two-factor authentication. The fob and the associated 
number displayed are unique to each user. 
To log into the SFE, the user must present his PIN and the 
current pseudo-random number that is displayed on his fob. The 
SFE then accesses the SecurLD server that supports the enclave to 
determine if the PIN and pseudo-random number provided by the 
user match the PIN and current pseudo random number known by 
If there is a match, then the user is successfully 
authenticated. 
The regulations that mandate the security requirements for 
the Columbia system require a password that includes three of the 
four types of characters (upper and lower case letter, number and 
punctuation). Unfortunately, SecurID with its time-varying 
pseudo-random numbers and its PIN supports only two types of 
characters, numbers and letters, with no distinction made for case. 
Thus, the SFE must also enforce password or public key 
authentication as well as SecurID. 
, the server. 
In addition, after authenticating to the SFE, users have to 
again authenticate to the particular system within the enclave that 
they want to use, since each system must support only 
authenticated users and not all users have privileges to use all of 
the systems located within the enclave. 
6.1 Improved Usability 
With the use of two-factor authentication and the need for all 
users to authenticate at the SFE and also at the particular system 
within the enclave that they want to use, a tension existed between 
strong authentication and ease of use. To provide some mitigation 
for this tension, the SFE was designed with a capability that we 
call SSH-pass-through. SSH-pass-through involves a combination 
of ssh-agent and public key authentication. To use SSH-pass- 
through, a user must place his public key on both the SFE and on 
the systems within the enclave that he wants to use. He must also 
provide the following in the ssh config file on his local system: 
Host Columbia-sfel 
ProxyCommand ssh userA~,sfel.xxx.~w.zzz \ 
IusrIlocaVbinlssh-proxy columbia.xxx.yyy.zzz 
In the actual configuration file, xxx.yyy.zzz represent the 
remainder of the address for sfel and Columbia, which in this 
example are assumed to be on the name subnet. 
When a user issues the command ssh Columbia-sfel, this will 
initiate a connection to the IP address sfel .xxx.yyy.zzz. Since all 
access to the SFE requires two-factor authentication, the user will 
be prompted to perform his SecurID authentication. The SSH 
daemon will also perform public key authentication with the ssh- 
agent on the user’s system. 
Note that the user had to perform only the SecurID 
authentication - the public key authentication was invisible to him 
since it was performed by his ssh-agent running on his local 
workstation. The configuration file then indicates that the ssh- 
proxy program on sfel should be invoked using IP address 
co1umbia.xxx.yyy.zzz as an argument. This will establish an ssh 
connection with the ssh daemon on the Columbia system, which 
will perform public key authentication with the ssh-agent on the 
user’s local workstation. Again, this is invisible to the user, since 
it will be performed automatically by his ssh-agent. The net result 
of this is that the user personally had to perform only SecurID 
authentication with the SFE, with public key authentication at the 
SFE and again at the Columbia system being performed 
automatically on his behalf by his ssh-agent. Through this simple 
approach, the tension between providing a higher level of 
authentication, while still facilitating usability was reduced. 
6.2 Implementation Issues 
Because the SFE represents a single point of failure for 
access to the systems within the Columbia system enclave, two 
identical SFEs are provided. A significant design issue that had to 
be addressed was the nature of the interaction between the two 
SFEs and whether the SFEs should project a single SFE at a single 
IP address, or two SFEs, each at their own IP addresses. Various 
approaches were considered for supporting the single IP address, 
but they either involved additional Complexity to deal with failure 
detection and hand-off, or they complicated the task of managing 
the public keys required for SSH pass-through. Having separate, 
independent SFEs simplified the design, since neither had to be 
aware of the state of the other. In general, for security systems 
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with equivalent capability, the best choice is usually to select the 
simpler design approach. 
In support of the tamper proof requirement of a security 
reference monitor, the SFE has been developing using a Linux 
operating system that was stripped of all but the functional 
capability needed to support the SFE's identification and 
authentication functions. Since users will actually log onto the 
SFE to install their public keys (for SSH pass-through), the SFE 
was developed with a strong effort to minimize the amount of 
functional capability that was installed on the system and also 
l i t  the hc t ions  that are available to users. For example, users 
do not even have the ability to make a directory, since this is not a 
function that they need to either log through the SFE or transfer a 
file using scp. All users are restricted to a very limited execution 
environment on the SFE. 
This tumper proof requirement is further supported by the 
physical separation between the SFE and the other systems within 
the enclave. This means that changes to the computers within the 
enclave do not affect the SFE software. This physical separation 
also means that the SFE is physically isolated from any malicious 
processing that might take place on the Columbia system's kont 
end or backend nodes. The reduced functionality and physical 
separation both support, but do not guarantee, the tumper proof 
requirement of a security reference monitor. 
Another advantage of the SFE approach is that the SFE 
represents a single point for imposing two-factor authentication 
for users, rather than having each of the systems within the 
enclave having to support this. 
Each SFE is implemented on dual hyper-threaded 3.2 
Gigahertz processors with a Gigabyte of RAM running the Linux 
operating system. The two identical SFEs, provided for 
redundancy, are each capable of handling the whole SFE load. Of 
note is the fact that this is just a commodity system that has no 
particularly unique requirements and is available for a modest 
cost. 
7. UNATTENDED ACCESS CONTROL 
A major challenge in the development of the perimeter 
protection system for the Columbia system was support for 
unattended fde transfers within an environment that required the 
use of SecurID. As has been noted, SecurD authentication 
requires that a user read a time-varying pseudo-random number 
from a physical SecurID fob device and then enter it and a PIN in 
order to authenticate. The problem arises if a file needs to be 
transferred into the enclave as part of a script or other program 
running on a remote system at a time when the user is not present 
with his fob to perform the SecurID authentication. This 
represents yet another tension between security and usability. 
?e solution to this problem is the Secure Unattended Proxy, 
which is a security component that allows a user to preauthorize a 
number of unattended file transfers for a limited future period 
using his SecurD fob This authorization is based on the user's 
acquisition of a limited duration publiclprivate key pair, which is 
obtained based on SecurID authentication. In this way, SecurID 
authentication is tightly bound to the unattended fide transfer, 
since the key pair needed to perform the transfer required the use 
of SecurlD to obtain it. In addition, the actual file transfer requires 
the use of public key authentication, which is much more resistant 
to compromise than are passwords. 
7.1 Use Scenario for Improved Usability 
Under this approach, the user accesses a key server and 
performs identification and authentication with SecurID and a 
password. This triggers the creation of a publiclprivate key pair. 
The key server deploys the public key to the Secure Unattended 
Proxy component and to the target machine, such as the Columbia 
system. The user is then provided with a private key, which he can 
save on his system. This key is good for a limited period of time, 
such as a week. After this time, the Secure Unattended Proxy will 
no longer accept that key for authentication and the user must 
generate another. 
At the time of the file transfer, the private key must be 
available to the software, such as a script, that is performing the 
transfer. The script initiates the file transfer through the Secure 
Unattended Proxy. The Secure Unattended Proxy verifies that the 
file transfer command is one of the authorized protocols (e.g., scp, 
sftp or bbFTP), and that the arguments that accompany the 
command are consistent with security concerns. If necessary the 
Secure Unattended Proxy will re-write the command such that it 
complies with the security policy. This rewriting is very critical to 
the security of the system, hence it must be carefully validated for 
correctness. To use the system, the private key must be loaded 
into an ssh-agent, after which scp (or s f t p  or bbFTP) transfers can 
be performed using an appropriate command such a the following 
which is used for an scp transfer: 
scp -S scpwrap file target.xxx.yyy.zzz:newfile 
where "scpwrap" is a wrapper that initiates the transfer 
through the Secure Unattended Proxy: 
#!/bin/sh 
exec ssh sup 1 .xxx.yyy.zzz 
For bbFTP, transfers can be performed using a command 
such as: 
bbftp -L "Ssh q SUpl.xxx.yyy.ZZZ SSh -4'' \ 
-e "put /dir/file newfile" t&get.xxx.yyy.zzz 
Once the Secure Unattended Proxy is satisfied that the file 
transfer command complies with the security policy, it forwards 
the command on to a dedicated SSH daemon on the target system, 
such as the Columbia system front end. Security code associated 
with the daemon ensures that the Columbia system actually 
invokes the command string that has been provided. For a 
protocol such as bbFTP, the SSH daemon will spawn a bbFTP 
server that will create new connections between the Columbia 
system and the remote site that has requested the file transfers. 
These connections are dynamically authorized to pass through the 
perimeter using the perimeter controller, as will be described in 
section 8. 
7.2 Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures 
The temporary private key file cannot be encrypted or else 
the unattended batch processes cannot use it. As a means to 
impose security restrictions on unattended operation, the 
directories into which files can be transferred are limited when 
using the Secure Unattended Proxy. If the user's private key were 
to be compromised, this would prevent the unrestricted 
overwriting of files within the use's directory space. 
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Security relevant files such as the user‘s public key can never 
be written. For other files, the user must specify the set of 
directories to which the unattended file transfer may write, using a 
configuration file in the user’s home directory. Creation of this 
configuration file must be done through a separate interactive 
session, which requires SecurID. This configuration f i e  specifies 
which directories can receive the unattended f i e  transfers. No 
transfer will occur if at least one directory is not listed in the 
configuration file. This is enforced by dynamically injected code 
in the SSH server of the target machine. 
While it is true that the one week key lifetime does introduce 
a one week window of opportunity for an intruder to compromise 
the system, under the current design, even if a potential intruder 
were to capture the public key, the damage that could be caused 
would be carefully limited to being able to dump files to only to 
the preauthorized directories. 
While work is underway to increase the capability of this 
unattended access, an attempt will be made to continue to limit the 
damage that could be caused by the capture of a private key. 
8. NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
One of the signifioant accomplishments of the Columbia 
security project has been the implementation of an approach for 
supporting network-oriented software that requires a relatively 
large number of ports to be opened through the perimeter 
protection system. Such software includes grid software as well as 
high performance file transfer software such as bbFTP. The goal 
is to address the tension between supporting network-oriented 
software that wants to open up a significant number of ports, 
without allowing many holes (ports) to be opened through the 
perimeter in case these network systems should need a particular 
port. 
The Perimeter Enforcer and the Perimeter Controller, 
introduced in the architecture section, are the two bomponents that 
provide a capability to dynamically open and close ports in 
response to the needs of network-oriented software operating 
within the Columbia system enclave. 
In order the be able to support network traffic at the leading 
edge of commercial technology (currently 1 OGigabits/sec), the 
Perimeter Enforcer is a network device, which controls access by 
dynamically changing access control lists (ACLs]. The Perimeter 
Controller is a commodity computer that interacts with software 
on the systems within the enclave to determine what ports need to 
be opened, and then commands the Perimeter Enforcer to open 
and when appropriate, close the specified ports. 
As has been noted, the security policy for the Columbia 
system enclave is to permit all internally initiated connections, 
unless there is some security reason to deny connections to certain 
sites, but it is anticipated that there will be very limited exceptions 
to this policy. In addition, all incoming connections that are in 
response to an internally initiated connection are also allowed, if 
the relationship of this incoming connection to an internally 
initiated connection can be accurately established. 
The challenge comes with externally initiated connections 
that are not in response to an internally initiated connection for 
which the relationship can be established. In this case, the default 
setting for the Perimeter Enforcer is to deny all incoming 
connections. 
The goal of the Perimeter Enforcer is to dynamically open 
port access through the perimeter, on a host-specific, if- 
authorized, as-needed, just-in-time, dynamic basis. Experiments 
have shown that this can be accomplished by instrumenting the 
application so that this application instrumentation can request the 
Perimeter Controller to open or close specsed ports through the 
perimeter. The Perimeter Controller then takes the information 
from all of the applications and compiles this into changes in the 
ACLs on the Perimeter Enforcer. 
Because of the need to support 10 Gigabitskecond data 
network traffic, at this point in time the only devices that can 
handle this high data rate are network devices such as routers or 
switches - firewalls are not currently capable of handling these 
high data rates. Also, in general, the speed of firewalls will likely 
always lag behind the speed of network routers and switches. 
Hence for systems such as the Columbia system, which will 
always be operating on the frontier of speed, a security approach 
that <relies on firewall technology will probably never be 
appropriate since it will always lag behind routers and switches. 
At this point, there may be some confusion as to how the role 
of such systems as the SFE or the Secure Unattended Proxy 
(which each support file transfers) relates to the role of the 
Perimeter Enforcer/Controller, whose purpose is to open ports for 
network software such as for file transfers. For protocols such as 
SCP, if the transfer is initiated through the SFE, then both the 
control conaections and the data connections travel through the 
SFE. The Perimeter Controller allows unrestricted access to the 
SSH daemon ports on the SFE as well as the appropriate ports on 
the Secure Unattended Proxy. For a high performance transfer 
such as one involving bbFTP, while the initial control channel 
would travel through the SFE (for a user initiated interactive 
transfer) or the Secure Unattended Proxy (for a script initiated 
transfer), the resulting data channels would not be mediated by the 
SFE or Secure Unattended Proxy. The data channel would, 
however, be mediated by the Perimeter Enforcer. Ports would be 
dynamically opened in response to commands from the Perimeter 
Controller, based on instrumentation of the bbFTP software. 
9. RELATEDWORK 
As one means of assessing the state of related work, at its 
inception, the Columbia system project performed site visits to six 
of the nation’s major high performance computer centers and 
performed an interview with a seventh. The observed 
architectures from these visits were used to formulate a taxonomy 
that is shown in Figure 2. Note that this taxonomy relates to just 
the seven sites that were visited or interviewed. The basic 
constructs of this taxonomy could be extended to other 
architectures, but this is not the objective of this analysis, since we 
wanted to understand what other high-end computer centers were 
actually doing. 
At the top of the figure is the fully open type, which imposes 
no additional security controls on access to the high end computer 
other than those provided by its own identification and 
authentication system. At the other extreme (at the bottom of the 
figure) is the virtual private network (VPN) type, which 
establishes an encrypted link between the user’s client computer 
and the high-end system. In this particular case, mirroring one of 
the visited sites, this types also includes router enforced access 
restrictions based on static access control lists (ACLs). Because 
VPN supports an encrypted link from client to high-end system, 
special VPN client software would have to be installed on all 
client machines, which we did not want to impose on the 
Columbia system users. 
Architecture types that impose some mediation (other than 
encryption) on external access to the high-end system represent 
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the middle ground of the systems visited or interviewed. In the 
static ACL type, ACLs on a network router are used to restrict 
which external sites can communicate with the high-end system. 
A slight variation of this type, which moves toward the dynamic 
type is an approach in which external sites are automatically 
end stateful firewalls do not yet support inspection at the full 10 
Gibabithec line-rates already supported by core routers and 
switches, thus are not suitable in high performance environments. 
Several projects exist for limiting the user to specific actions 
when connecting via ssh. For example, rssh [12] and scponly [14] 
Static ACL type 
- a,-- - 
Figure 2: Taxonomies of Security Architectures 
blocked using ACLs if these external sites are caught scanning the 
high-end computer. In this case, the block is dropped after a 
certain amount of time has elapsed with no additional scans. 
In the dynamic ACL case, this mediation is dynamically 
configured in response to user requests, with the default being no 
access by external users. In the particular type shown in the 
figure, an identificationlauthentication web site is used for user 
identification and authentication and then when successful, an 
ACL is dynamically set on the router to allow the IP address 
associated with the successfully authenticated user to establish 
connections to the high end system through the router. 
The Columbia system expands on this by using the Perimeter 
Enforcer/Controller to authorize a finer granularity of perimeter 
access (port) rather than the IP address. A key server authorization 
approach is used in the Secure Unattended Proxy, but an in-line 
SFE approach was selected for the Columbia system. 
The concept of a secure front end is not new, going back to 
the very early days of the computer security community. Some 
early references to this idea can be found in the SDC 
communications kernel work [7] and the communications 
operating system network front end COSNFE work [8]. While 
these were both high assurance projects, the idea of a front-end 
processor to securely handle fimctions for a main computer go 
back to the early days of the field. 
A form of dynamic port control is provided by stateful 
firewalls such as [3], which interpret specific protocols to 
determine when a given port needs to be’opened between a given 
pair of hosts. For example, m the case of FTP, these firewalls will 
allow only data connections to an FTP server from hosts that have 
successllly authenticated to its control port. Such support is 
generally limited to a small set of standardized protocols, 
however, thus cannot be applied to new or emerging protocols 
such as those for the grid. Protocols that use encryption over the 
control channel also cannot be supported. Finally, current high- 
can be used to allow only file transfers through authenticated ssh 
sessions. Both of these projects, however, require changes to user 
shells on the target system, which makes it impossible for those 
users to access the system for other purposes even when logging 
in interactively. The Secure Unattended Proxy enforces a similar 
policy for unattended transfers, but does not affect user shells on 
the target systems, thus they can still log in interactively with full 
functionality. It also allows a finer granularity of control over 
which files can be written on the target system. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
The Columbia perimeter control system has provided a high 
level of perimeter protection for general purpose processing 
systems in general and a large supercomputer in particular, while 
mitigating the tension that can result in ensuring a reasonable 
level of usability. As has been shown in the paper, SFE 
authentication is strong with the two-factor authentication 
provided by SecurID, but usability is enhanced with the SSH- 
pass-through capability. While all processing on Columbia must 
be tied to SecurID authentication, the tension that this requirement 
has with unattended, script-based file transfers has been mitigated 
though the use of SecurID to pre-authorize a limited duration, 
limited capabiIity for future file transfers. The tension between 
the need for network-oriented software to open many ports in the 
course of performing its function and the need for the perimeter to 
lock-down the number of ports that are kept open has been 
mitigated by an approach which dynamically opens ports on an a 
host-specific, if-authorized, as-needed, just-in-time, dynamic 
basis. All of this is accomplished automatically, without the user’s 
knowledge. 
In the course of mitigating this tension between strong 
perimeter protection and usability, Columbia’s perimeter security 
design has also satisfied many computer security principles [ 131. 
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Dynamically opening and closing ports so that they are available 
only when needed and closed at other times is an example of the 
security concept of least privilege. The overall architectural 
design is based on the complete mediation provided by a security 
reference monitor. The physical separation of the various security 
components that provide the perimeter’s security reference 
monitor supports the reference monitor’s tamper proof property. 
Minimiziig the capabilities available to the SFE users also seeks 
to eliminate capabilities that the users could use to gain 
unauthorized access, which also supports the tamper proof 
requirement. The use of front-end systems such as the SFE for 
authentication while still requiring authentication on the particular 
system to be accessed within the enclave is an example of defense 
in depth. The SUP exhibits separation of privilege since an 
interactive session through the SFE is required to set up the 
configuration file to authorize transfers into particular directories, 
while the SUP itself mediates the actual transfer. 
Even though Columbia is an unclassified system, the overall 
design has attempted to provide a high level of protection, while 
still ensuring usability. Although the techniques have been 
applied to a supercomputer, we believe that they are equally 
applicable to other systems that support general purpose 
processing from a large number of distributed users 
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